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In this paper we extend the behavioral macroeconomic model as proposed by De Grauwe
(2012) to include a banking sector. The behavioral model takes the view that agents have
limited cognitive abilities. As a result, it is “rational” to use simple forecasting rules and to
subject the use of these rules to a fitness test. Agents are then driven to select the rule that
performs best. The behavioral model produces endogenous and self-fulfilling movements
of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits). Our main result is that the existence of banks
intensifies these movements, creating a greater scope for booms and busts. Thus, banks do
not create but amplify animal spirits. We find that increases in the equity ratios of banks
tend to reduce the importance of animal spirits over the business cycle. The other policy
conclusion we derive from our results is that the central bank has an important
responsibility for stabilising output: output stabilization is an instrument to “tame the
animal spirits”. This has the effect of improving the trade-off between inflation and output
volatility.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Since the start of the financial crisis DSGE modelers have hurriedly attempted to introduce a banking sector into their
models. This has been done in the framework of models that assume rational expectations, i.e. that assume that the
representative agent understands the complexity of the underlying model. If there is anything we have learned from the
financial crisis it is that this crisis was made possible by the fact that agents do not understand the complexity of the world
in which they live. Instead, their cognitive abilities are very limited. Therefore there is a need to introduce a banking sector
in models that recognize the cognitive limitations of agents. While recent contributions have explored the need to introduce
banking in an agent based simulation framework (e.g., Ashraf et al., 2011; Delli Gatti et al., 2008), no attempts have been
made to introduce bounded rationality and rule switching behaviour in a macro model that preserves the spirit of the
original “financial accellerator approach” of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Bernanke et al. (1999). This is what we
attempt to do in this paper.
Economists have long recognized the role of expectations’ formation. This has been mainly in the light of evidence from
experimental studies supporting the idea of information processing with agents’ limited cognitive abilities. Recent
contributions, including Carroll (2003), Mankiw et al. (2004), Branch (2004, 2007) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) provide
empirical evidence in favor of agents' heterogeneity using survey data on inflation expectations. Honkapohja and Mitra
(2005) point to the idea of agents possibly using structurally different learning rules. In the same vein, Frenkel and Frooter B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
.
rauwe).
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(2013), and Hommes (2011), find evidence in favor of heterogeneity in learning to forecast, conditional on recent forecasting
performance, using both survey and laboratory data. Despite this evidence, the dynamic effects of expectations’
heterogeneity has been explored only recently in macro models (for a survey, see Milani (2012)), and even less so in
models with a banking sector (e.g., Ashraf et al., 2011; Delli Gatti et al., 2008).
Much of the previous attempts to model expectations that deviate from rational expectations have tried to stay as close
as possible to the rational expectations’ assumption. In these types of models, expectations of agents are assumed to satisfy a
number of intuitive properties, including linearity and the law of iterated expectations (LIE). These include studies focusing
on alternative forms of information processing, such as learning (Sargent, 1994; Evans and Honkapohja, 1999, 2001; Milani,
2007), rational inattention (Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2005; Sims, 2003, 2005; Ball et al., 2005; Schorfheide, 2005);
“sticky information” (Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Levine et al., 2012; Trabandt, 2007; Mankiw and Reis, 2007; Reis, 2009 in the
DSGE literature) or bounded rationality at large (Sargent, 1994). All such models ask whether agents would converge to the
same rational expectation equilibrium if they started with a more limited degree of knowledge or they were allowed to
learn over time (for a discussion see Milani, 2012; Cornea et al., 2012; Massaro, 2013).1 These types of approaches generally
produce sunspot-equilibria or multiple steady states (see Howitt and McAfee, 1992; Evans et al., 1998; and Evans and
Honkapohja, 1999, 2001; Branch and Evans, 2007), overall improving the endogenous propagation of shocks, and hence
model fit. Overall, however, as remarked previously, in the majority of cases such models have to tradeoff between rational
and bounded-rational agents.
Following Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), in this paper we treat the realization of economic choices as being an
interactive process between different types of agents. In particular, following De Grauwe (2008a, 2008b, 2011, 2012), our
model includes two types of agents. The first type are fundamentalists, who forecast output and inflation based on their
equilibrium value. The second type use the simplest backward-looking rule of thumb – i.e., their forecast coincides with the
last available observation – to forecast future the output gap and inflation. De Grauwe (2008a, 2008b, 2011, 2012) is not the
only one to model heterogenous expectations in a New Keynesian Model (NKM). Recent examples of expectations’
heterogeneity in a NK framework include Branch and McGough (2009) and Levine et al. (2012). In particular, Branch and
McGough (2009) introduce heterogeneous expectations into a New Keynesian framework where the forward looking term
in a New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is a convex combination of backward- and forward-looking behaviors. The
authors show that a microfounded NKM under bounded rationality can be obtained if specific axioms within the optimizing
behavior of households and firms are considered, implying the law of iterated expactations (LIE). These axioms ensure the
ability of agents to forecast the output gap and inflation at the micro level as well as aggregation at the macro level. Overall,
however, such an approach, while making an important contribution to bridge aggregate forecasting rules with micro
derivation, still strives to keep the benchmark rational expectations valid.
De Grauwe's approach is instead a more “radical” departure (Milani, 2007) from the previous literature (e.g. Branch and
McGough, 2009), as no agent in the economy is assumed to have rational expectations. No agent in this economy posseses
sufficient cognitive skills to understand the complexity of the underlying model and to know the distribution of the
exogenous shocks hitting the economy. Rationality in this model is introduced instead by assuming agents are willing to
learn from their mistakes. Thus, the concept of rationality used in De Grauwe (2008a, 2008b, 2011, 2012), and followed by
this paper, is consistent with the idea that agents are aware of the fact that their beliefs are biased, but they are willing to
learn from the past. In this set up, the heuristic behaviour employed in the formation of expectations is more “drastic” than
the one employed by the standard bounded rationality literature in the sense that rational expectation equilibria are not
nested by the model.2
We believe the assumption of individuals having cognitive limitations – leading them to use simple rules that do not take
all the available information into account – is necessary once we take the view that agents are limited in their capacity to
collect and process the immense information set that is present in the world. In our opinion, this evolutionary rationality is a
better way to describe rationality in a world that is too complex and uncertain for agents to understand.2. The model
In this section we first present the baseline behavioral macroeconomic model proposed by De Grauwe (2008a, 2008b,
2012). We then go a step further by decomposing aggregate demand into consumption and investment demand. Finally
banks are introduced.1 Rationality would then not be achieved immediately either because of the existence of explicit costs in acquiring all information in the economy (i.e.
full rationality implies agents already have full knowledge about the structure of the economy), or because agents are assumed to update their information
only with some probability in each period.
2 The model presented in De Grauwe (2008a, 2008b, 2011, 2012) thus differs from multiple equilibria models in that it does not rely on extraneous
“sunspots.” The economic fluctuations are driven instead by the intrinsic random shocks of the model. This is similar to Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Ch.
14), but differ from the latter in that it does not have multiple equilibria under rational expectations.
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Our baseline behavioral macroeconomic model (BMM) consists of three equations. An aggregate demand (AD) function:
yt ¼ a1 ~Etytþ1þð1a01Þyt1þa2ðrt ~Etπtþ1Þþεt ; ða2o0Þ ð1Þ
an aggregate supply (AS):
πt ¼ b1 ~Etπtþ1þð1b1Þπt1þb2ytþηt ; ð2Þ
and a Taylor rule (TR):
rt ¼ c1ðπtπnt Þþc2ytþc3rt1þut : ð3Þ
In the equations above, yt is the output gap, rt the nominal interest rate, πt is inflation and εt is a white noise disturbance
term. Note that rt ~Etπtþ1
 
is the real interest rate, where ~Etð:Þ is the expectation operator, which is different from the
standard “rational expectation” term where the representative consumer is assumed to forecast using all the information
available. As explained in De Grauwe (2008a, 2008b, 2012), there is no direct derivation of the model at the microeconomic
level, albeit Eqs. (1)–(3) are consistent with the log-linearized version of most New Keynesian models. The baseline model,
based on Smets and Wouters (2007), shows how the AD is equivalent in fact to log-linearizing the Euler equation for
consumer optimization, to which a smoothing term is added (see for instance Woodford, 2003). Given the sign restrictions
posited, the aggregate demand equation has a very straightforward interpretation. Utility maximizing agents will want to
spend more on goods and services today when they expect future income to increase, and to spend less when the real
interest rate increases (De Grauwe, 2012).
Conversely, the aggreagate supply in Eq. (2) is the pure forward looking New Keynesian version of the AS based on Calvo-pricing
(see for instance, Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003; De Grauwe, 2012) when b1 ¼ 1 (Branch and McGough, 2009). As before, this
equation can be obtained by log-linearization around the steady state. With 0ob1o1 the relation incorporates an inertial term in
the vein of Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003).
Finally, the Taylor rule describes the behavior of the central bank, with πnt being the inflation target. Based on TR, the
central bank is assumed to raise the interest rate, rt , when the observed inflation rate increases relative to the announced
inflation target. The extent to which the central bank reacts to inflation depends on the coefficient c1. Similarly, when the
output gap increases, the central bank is assumed to raise the interest rate. The intensity with which it does so depends on
the coefficient c2. Finally, the central bank is assumed to smooth the interest rate. This smoothing behavior is represented by
the lagged interest rate in Eq. (3).
Under rational expectations, the forward-looking terms, which are the expectations of the output gap and inflation respectively
at time t þ 1 would be given by ~Etytþ1 ¼ Etytþ1 and ~Etπtþ1 ¼ Etπtþ1. As discussed before, in this paper we depart from rational
expectations by considering instead the behaviorial approach of De Grauwe (2011, 2012). In this set up, expectations are a convex
combination of the available heterogeneous expectation operators. The selection of the forecasting rules depends on the forecast
performance of the different rules given by a publicly available fitness measure, which is updated in every period. For each variable
we reduce the problem to a binary forecast choice (Brock and Hommes, 1997, 1998). After the equilibrium is revealed, forecasts are
evaluated ex post according to the publicly available fitness measure and new fractions are determined. These updated fractions are
used to determine the next period output gap and inflation and so on. Agents’ rationality thus consists in choosing the predictor
that performs better based on its past performance.
We now explain the selection mechanism in detail. Agents are supposed to forecast the output gap (y) and inflation ðπÞ using
two alternative forecasting rules. In the first one, (fundamentalist rule), agents are assumed to use the steady-state value of the
output gap, yn, here normalized to zero, to make a forecast. In the second one (called extrapolative rule), agents extrapolate the
output gap's past observation. Analogously for inflation, agents are assumed to switch between a fundamentalist and an
extrapolative rule. In an environment where the central bank explicitly announces its inflation target, inflation fundamentalists are
assumed to base their expectations on the central bank's target, πn. By contrast, inflation extrapolators behave exactly as output
gap's extrapolators do: by naively forecasting inflation based – each time – on inflation's latest available observation.
Market forecasts of output gap and inflation are obtained as a weighted average of each respective forecasting rule (for
each variable y; π). In what follows we illustrate the behavioral rules for the output gap (y). A similar notation can be used for
inflation (π). Convex combinations of the two forecasting rules are determined as
~Etytþ1 ¼ αf ;t ~E
f
t ytþ1þαe;t ~E
e
t ytþ1; ð4Þ
where the fundamentalist rule ~E
f
t ytþ1 is defined as
~E
f
t ytþ1 ¼ yn;
and the extrapolative ~E
e
t ytþ1 rule is
~E
e
t ytþ1 ¼ θyt1:
The latter is a form of adaptive or extrapolative expectations. Adaptive expectations of this kind have been used by Brock and
Hommes (1997, 1998), Branch (2002), Branch and McGough (2009), and Pesaran (1987). When θ¼ 1 the operator is usually called
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Hommes, 1998). To keep the model tractable, in the paper we assume θ¼ 1, but refer to the latter as an extrapolative rule.
In the model, we focus on the cyclical component of each variable, which makes the model symmetric with respect to
zero (see, e.g., Harvey and Jaeger, 1993).3 In this environment, the equilibrium forecast for each variable will be constant
over time and equal to each variable's steady-state value. This is realistic in a stationary world, where, for instance, an
inflation target of, e.g., zero would imply the central bank seeks to minimize deviations of the (realized) target rate of
inflation from the corresponding time-varying equilibrium (steady-state) value. The same reasoning applies to output in
deviation from its potential (i.e. the output gap).
In Eq. (4), the weights attached to each forecasting rule (αf ;t for the fundamentalist rule and αe;t for the extrapolative rule)
vary endogenously within the model. The reason for having different forecasting rules is supported by the empirical
literature. For instance, Frankel and Froot (1990) find that professional market participants in the foreign exchange markets
expect recent price changes to continue in the short term, while they expect mean reversion to the fundamental (steady
state) value over the long term. Regarding the use of extrapolative rules, backward-looking forecasting strategies, although
extremely simple, may be useful particularly when the underlying stochastic process is a random walk. For instance, for a
persistent process like inflation (or its gap) (see Cogley (2002), Cogley and Sargent (2007)), naive expectations can be a good
predictor at times (see Cornea et al. (2012), De Grauwe (2012) and Roos and Schmidt (2012)).
We base our forecasting rule mechanism on a dynamic predictor selection, in line with discrete choice theory. This mechanism
allows switching between the two forecasting rules by computing the utility of the two rules and increase (decrease) the relative
weight of one rule against the other in each period. Under the formalization that the utilities of the two alternative rules have a
deterministic and a random component – and assuming the latter to be logistically distributed (see Manski and McFadden, 1981;
Anderson et al., 1992) – the weights in Eq. (4) can be defined based on each period utility (U :;t , see also De Grauwe (2012)).
For the output gap, the corresponding weights take the form
αyf ;t ¼
expðγUyf ;tÞ
expðγUyf ;tÞþexpðγU
y
e;tÞ
and
αye;t ¼ 1αyf ;t ¼
expðγUye;tÞ
expðγUyf ;tÞþexpðγU
y
e;tÞ
;
where each rule's utility is determined by
Uyf ;t ¼ 
X1
k ¼ 0
wk ytk1 ~E
f
tk2ytk1
h i2
and
Uye;t ¼ 
X1
k ¼ 0
wk ytk1 ~E
e
tk2ytk1
h i2
:
In the expression above, wk ¼ ðpk 1pð ÞÞ are geometrically declining weights (with 1rpr0Þ, allowing to take into
account the degree of forgetfulness in the model (see De Grauwe (2012)). The parameter γ measures the “intensity of
choice”. It parameterizes the extent to which the deterministic component of utility determines actual choice. When γ ¼ 0
utility is purely stochastic. In that case agents decide to be fundamentalist or extrapolator by tossing a coin and the
probability to be one or the other is exactly 0.5. When γ ¼ 1 utility is fully deterministic and the probability of using one
rule or the other is either 1 or 0. The parameter γ can also be interpreted as expressing the willingness to learn from past
performance. When γ ¼ 0 this willingness is zero; it increases with the size of γ.
From the utility maximization problem, it is clear that most agents will tend to choose the predictor that yielded higher
utility over the past. Agents are thus “boundedly” rational in the sense that they use simple rules but subject these rules to a
“fitness test”. The extent to which agents switch between rules depends on how well a given rule performs ex post relative
to the other. In this sense agents learn from their mistakes.
Importantly, this mechanism allows endogenizing the evolution of the distribution of heterogeneous agents, with this
proportion (αt) being estimated at each time.4 This is different from other approaches, e.g., Branch and McGough (2009),
where weights are not endogenously esitmated by the model. As underlined by Cornea et al. (2012) the empirical evidence
does support the idea of changing the proportion of heterogeneous agents over time. Carroll (2003) and Mankiw et al.3 For this reason, a non-negative interest rate constraint is not applied in the model: a negative interest rate in this economy should be understood as a
negative interest rate gap (i.e. the interest rate in deviation from the natural rate of interest). Based on the model parameters, it is possible to infer the
unconditional probability of a negative real interest rate gap (that is when expected inflation gap is higher than the nominal interest rate in deviation from
the natural rate of interest). In line with standard predictions, a negative real interest rate stimulates the economy, i.e. the output gap will be positively
affected.
4 While the ex-ante the probability of using each forecasting rule for each variable is 0.50, ex post this probability may vary. Matching those
probabilities with empirical evidence from survey data is on our research agenda, but, for the moment, it remains beyond the scope of this analysis.
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Castle et al. (2010) test for multiple structural breaks in inflation expectations in a NK Phillips curve framework.
2.2. Decomposing the aggregate demand
The aggregate demand described previously can be decomposed into consumption (c) and investment (i) sides of the
economy:
yt ¼ ctþ it : ð10Þ
We specify the consumption and investment equations, respectively, as follows:
ct ¼ d1ytþd2 ~Etytþ1þ 1d1d2ð Þyt1þd3 rt ~Etπtþ1
 
þvct ; ðd3o0Þ ð5Þ
it ¼ e1 ~Etytþ1þe2 rt ~Etπtþ1
 
þvit : ðe2o0Þ ð6Þ
According to Eq. (10), output yt is absorbed by consumption or investment. Public expenditure and taxation are absent in
the model which ensures that income and output correspond in the consumption and investment equations.
Consumption, c, depends on three factors. First, on current income, according to the parameter d1 which represents the
marginal propensity of consumption. Second, it depends on the expected future output gap, ~Etytþ1. The latter term is
equivalent to considering an exogenous level of private consumption even at level zero of income. Third, consumption
depends on past income, introducing a habit formation mechanism which is assumed to slow down the adjustment of
consumption to its optimal level after a shock (see also De Grauwe (2008a, 2008b, 2012), Smets and Wouters (2007)). Finally,
consumption depends negatively on the ex ante real interest rate ðrt ~Etπtþ1Þ, for d3o0.
Following a standard approach, investment depends first on a forward looking component, the expected future output
gap, ~Etytþ1. Second, it negatively depends on the real interest rate, according to the parameter e2o0, which measures the
sensitivity of investment to changes in the ex ante real interest rate.
Substituting (5) and (6) into (10) and comparing it with (1) yields the following cross-parameter restrictions: a1 ¼ ðd2þe1Þ=
ð1d1Þ, a1' ¼ ðd2Þ=ð1d1Þ, a2 ¼ ðd3þe2Þ=ð1d1Þ (with 0od1o1) and vctþvit ¼ εt .
2.3. Introducing banks
Banks are implicitly included in this model, since the interest rate is the price of credit. However, in order to account for
banks explicitly, we introduce financial intermediaries which are assumed to collect money from savers (consumers) and
lend it to borrowers (firms). The balance sheet of commercial banks accounts for loan supply (LS), on the asset side, and
deposits (D), on the liability side. Banks’ equity (nb) serves as an important cushion against unexpected losses. It is defined
as the difference between assets and liabilities:
LSt ¼ nbt þDt : ð7Þ
For a commercial bank, the leverage is thus the ratio between its loans and equity. In this respect, banks are subject to an
explicit capital-to-asset ratio, i.e.
nbt
LSt
¼ κ; ð8Þ
with κ being the equity ratio (the inverse of banks’ leverage ratio). When a firm borrows money from a bank, it must pay an
interest which normally exceeds the interest rates that savers receive for deposits. Hence, the cost of a loan from banks, ρ, is
usually equal to the rate savers receive (here equal to the risk-free rate set by the central bank, r) plus a spread, x.
ρt ¼ rtþxt : ð9Þ
The investment demand in Eq. (6) is hence replaced with Eq. (60), assuming investment to depend on the cost of bank
loans, as
i¼ e1 ~Etytþ1þe2ðρt ~Etπtþ1Þ: ðe2o0Þ ð60Þ
In this way, the spread is assumed to affect the overall investment decisions of firms directly.
Incorporating banks into the aggregate demand – by means of Eqs. (10), (5), (9) and (6') – gives:
yt ¼ a1 ~Etytþ1þð1a01Þyt1þa2ðrt ~Etπtþ1Þþða2þa3Þxtþεt ; ðða2þa3Þo0Þ ð100Þ
where a1 and a2 are defined as before and a3 ¼ d3=ð1d1Þ. This new aggregate demand function in (1'') subsitutes the one
in (1) or (1'), where banks are absent. Comparisons of Eqs. (1) and (1'') suggest that – while the aggregate demand still
depends on future expected and past income and (negatively) on the real interest rate – it also depends on the spread, xt .
Since the slope coefficient ða2þa3Þ is negative for 0od1o1 and e2o0, i.e. a2þa3 ¼ e2=ð1d1Þ, this new aggregate demand
represents a negative relationship between y and x.
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DtDt1 ¼ st : ð10Þ
In the same vein, loan demand (LD) and investment are related by
LDt LDt1 ¼ it ; ð11Þ
Thus we assume that savings take the form of an accumulation of bank deposits, and investments by firms are financed
by bank loans only.
Saving, s, is finally determined as
st ¼ ytctvt ; ð12Þ
as in the standard IS-LM set up.
The next step in the analysis is to determine what the spread between the borrowing and the deposit rate is. We use the
financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). Defining nf as firms’ equity, we write
xt ¼ ρtrt ¼ φnft ; ðφo0Þ ð13Þ
An increase in the firms’ equity reduces the spread and viceversa. The underlying financial accelerator theory is the
following. Banks have imperfect knowledge of the credit risk they take when granting a loan to a firm. To cover this credit
risk they charge a spread (xt). When the value of equity of the firm increases this is interpreted by the bank as an
improvement in the solvency of the firm. Thus, banks will perceive the credit risk to have declined allowing them to reduce
the spread. A decline in the value of the firms equity has the opposite effect. Such a decline is interpreted as reducing the
solvency of the firm and increasing the credit risk. Banks react by raising the spread.
A firm with more debt than equity is leveraged. We define the leverage ratio, τ, as
τ¼ L
D
t
nft
ð14Þ
To keep the model simple, it will be assumed here that firms keep the leverage ratio constant. According to Eq. (14), this
implies that as the loan demand increases the firm will issue more equity in the same proportion (in Section 6 we will make
firms’ leverage ratio endogenous).
By putting together Eqs. (11) and (14), one realizes that the equity of firms depends on the inverse of firms’ leverage ratio
(τ), which is the equity ratio, as
ntf ¼
1
τ
LDt1þ it
 
;
e.g., Bernanke et al. (1999).
The spread clears the lending market determining the total level of loanable funds to firms. Here, loan demand (LD) is a
function of investment, LDt ¼ LD ið Þ. Via Eq. (7) loan supply (LS) is a function of banks’ equity and deposits, i.e. LSt ¼ LSðnb;DÞ,
where bank equity is simply the difference between loans and deposits (subject to the contraint in Eq. (8)). Via the banks’
balance sheet the market is cleared for LS ¼ LD.
3. Solving the model
We obtain a model with five endogenous variables, the output gap, inflation, the borrowing-lending spread, savings and
the interest rate. The first four are obtained after solving the following set of equations:
1 b2 0 0
a2c1 1a2c2  a2þa3ð Þ 0
φτ1e2c1 φτ1e2c2 1φτ1e2
 
0
d3c1 ð1d1d3c2Þ 0 1
2
66664
3
77775
πt
yt
xt
st
2
6664
3
7775
¼
b1 0 0 0
a2 a1 0 0
φτ1e2 φτ1e1 0 0
d3 d2 0 0
2
66664
3
77775
~Etπtþ1
~Etytþ1
~Etxtþ1
~Etstþ1
2
66664
3
77775þ
1b1 0 0 0
0 1a1' 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 ð1d1d2Þ 0 0
2
66664
3
77775
πt1
yt1
xt1
st1
2
66664
3
77775
þ
0 0 0
a2c3 0 0
φτ1e2c3 φτ1 φτ1
d3c3 0 0
2
66664
3
77775
rt1
Dt1
nbt1
2
64
3
75þ
1
0
0
0
0
a2
φ1τe2
d3
0
1
0
ð1d1Þ
2
66664
3
77775
ηt
ut
ϵt
2
64
3
75
In compact form, this is written as AZt ¼ B ~EtZtþ1þCZt1þDXt1þEvt. As in De Grauwe (2008a, 2008b, 2011, 2012), a
solution for Zt is obtained as Zt ¼A1ðB ~EtZtþ1þCZt1þDXt1þEvtÞ with the only condition being A to be non-singular.
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output gap and inflation into the Taylor rule. Investments, equities and deposits are determined by the model solutions for
inflation, the output gap, the spread and savings.5
3.1. Model solution under rational expectations vs. “heuristics”
The expectational term with a tilde superscript in the system of equations above implies that we do not impose rational
expectations. By substitutitng the law of motion consistent with the heterogeneity of agents (extrapolators and
fundamentalists discussed before), it can be shown that the endogenous variables depend linearly on lagged endogenous
variables, their equilibrium forecasts, the usual predetermined variables and current exogenous shocks. In reduced form, the
model is written as:
AZt ¼ FZþGZt1þDXt1þEvt
where Z is a vector of constants, F¼ BΗ, G¼ B½IHþC, and H is a diagonal matrix, where the weights attached to each
variable's fundamentalist rule are on the main diagonal.
In other words, under consideration of the heuristics for the forecasts regarding the output and inflation expectations,
the forward looking term in Eqs. (2), (3), (5) and (6) is substituted by the equivalent expressions for the discrete choice
mechanism given in Section 2.1. It can be gauged indeed that the model becomes purely backward-looking and it can be
solved iteratively.
In a standard rational expectation environment, the vector of variables multiplied by Fwould typically be EtXtþ1 instead,
thus bringing the problem to the same level of a rational expectations’ problem with predetermined variables. In the latter
case, defining M as
M¼ F
1A F1G
I2 0
" #
implies the model solution would require having to deal with determinacy, depending on the magnitude of the eigenvalues
of M and the number of predetermined variables (see Blanchard and Khan (1980)).6
Other than fully-departing from rational expectations, the specification adopted in this paper is indeed different from
that of, e.g. Branch and McGough (2009), where a fraction of agents is rational (forward-looking) and the remainder is
adaptive (backward-looking); or that of Cornea et al. (2012), which differ from the former in that it allows forward-looking
agents not to have model-consistent expectations (rational) but to forcast according to a VAR present value model à la
Campbell and Shiller (1987). In both cases, however, rational expectation represents the limiting case.7
From a modeling point of view, keeping the rational expectation benchmark is not without difficulties. As underlined by
Milani (2012) and De Grauwe (2011, 2012) in the benchmark New Keynesian model under rational expectations, the model
fails to match the persistence of macroeconomic time-series. As a result, such a model is normally extended to include, in
addition to several highly-autocorrelated exogenous shocks, other sources of endogenous inertia, such as habit formation,
interest rate smoothing, sticky prices etc. (for a discussion see Milani (2012)). In Section 8, we empirically discuss some of
those issues.
4. Calibration
For the aggregate demand function we calibrate the parameters (d1; d2; e1) to match standard macroeconomic simulation
results, broadly consistent with De Grauwe (2011, 2012). This is to ensure comparability with the baseline macroeconomic model
without a credit sector. A Table of coefficient is provided in Appendix A. Overall, however, the parameters are calibrated consistent
with the intervening literature. The new banking sector parameters are calibrated as follows: d1 is computed to match a marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) out of income equal to 0.5, in line with the empirical literature pointing to a MPC in the range of
0:20:7 (Friedman,1963; Carroll, 2012; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010). The remaining parameters are derived consistently with the sign
restrictions posited, namely a firms’ leverage factor of τ¼ 1:43, following Pesaran and Xu (2013) and φo0. For the5 The spread and saving need not to be forecasted, as their forecasts do not enter the model. This does not affect the dynamics of the model (i.e. there is
no structure of higher order beliefs in our framework; see Section 3.1).
6 See also Binder and Pesaran (1996) and Evans and McGough (2005).
7 With respect to our approach, a methodological issue clearly arises. The forecasting rules (heuristics) introduced here are not derived at the micro
level and then aggregated. Instead, they are imposed ex post. As stressed in De Grauwe (2011), however, this has also been the approach in the learning
literature pioneered by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Ideally, one would like to derive the heuristics from the micro-level in an environment in which
agents experience cognitive problems. Branch and McGough (2009) propose an approach where a given number of axioms are needed for aggregation. In
particular, the axioms imposed in Branch and McGough impose regularity on the expectation operator and facilitate aggregation. As Branch and McGough
emphasizes, their axioms restrict agents’ expectations so that they satisfy the LIE at both an individual and aggregate level. The LIE at the individual level is
a reasonable assumption as it implies agents’ information set is constant over time. As the authors underline, however, the assumption of LIE at the
aggregate level requires a particular structure on higher-order beliefs, which may be a too restrictive assumption in the presence of unanticipated
structural breaks shifting or even changing the underlying distribution of e.g., output gap and inflation (see, e.g., Hendry and Mizon, 2010). We thus do not
make such an assumption here.
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desirable propery of being always positive, and consistent with the historical average of the bank prime lending rate vs. 6-month
Treasury bill spread, as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), corresponding to an average of about 250 basis points (see Fig. 1).
Banks’ equity ratio (the inverse of the leverage ratio, k) is set equal to 0.09, consistent with the target parametrization in Gerali et al.
(2010) and pretty much in line with the recent regulatory capital requirements for commercial banks.9
The parameters that govern the selection mechanism across rules are calibrated as in De Grauwe (2011), again to ensure
comparability (see Appendix A), which is γ ¼ 1 and p¼ 0:5. De Grauwe (2011) also explores the sensitivity of the results by
varying different key parameters in the switching mechanism, including the degree of forgetfullness in the model (pÞ or the
intensity of choice parameters in the Brock-Hommes function (γ). His results, showing that numerical results are attained
across different parameterization of the model, remain valid for our model as well.10
5. Results
5.1. Animal spirits drive the business cycles
Figs. 2 and 3 show the time pattern of output gap and animal spirits produced by the baseline model with banks in a typical
simulation run.We observe a strong cyclical movement in the output gap (Fig. 2). The source of these cyclical movements is seen to
be the index of animal spirits in the market (Fig. 3). We define animal spirits as the fraction of agents who forecast a positive output
gap. When this fraction is 1 all agents forecast such a positive output gap, i.e. they are all optimistic. When the fraction is zero all
agents forecast a negative output gap; they are all pessimistic. The model creates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism.
These are highly correlated with movements in the output gap (0.91) (see also De Grauwe (2008a, 2008b, 2011, 2012)). During
some periods, pessimism dominates and this translates into below average output growth. These pessimistic periods are followed
by optimistic periods when optimistic forecasts tend to dominate, with above average growth.
In Fig. 4 we present the frequency distribution of the output gap. It turns out that this distribution is not normal. It has fat tails (i.e.
kurtosis is 3.84 and normality is rejected with p-value 0.000 based on the Jarque-Bera test). Note that the stochastic shocks in the
model are all i.i.d. thus the non-normality of the distribution of the output gap is generated by themodel. This contrasts with standard
linear DSGE models that are only able to produce non-normal movements in output by introducing non-normally distributed shocks
(see also Section 8). The mechanism in our model that produces the non-normality is the interaction between animal spirits and
output. As more and more agents become, say, optimists, they forecast positive output gaps. These forecasts are self-fulfilling and
produce a boom, which tends to accelerate as more agents become optimists. The reverse happens when the downturn sets in.
We obtain more insight in this mechanism by plotting the frequency distribution of animal spirits in Fig. 5. The latter is
just a representation of the same animal spirits of Fig. 3, but in the frequency domain. We observe that there is a
concentration of observations at the extreme values of þ1 (everybody is optimist) and 0 (everybody is pessimist). Thus, the
dynamics of animal spirits are characterized by movements in optimism and pessimism, leading to “market frenzy” and
large movements in economic activity.
Fig. 6 shows the evolution of the spread in the time domain. The spread is negatively correlated with animal spirits
(0.087). The reason is that during an upturn of economic activity when agents are optimistic, the value of equity of firms
increases, leading banks to lower the spread. The opposite occurs during a downturn. The correlation coefficient is low,
however, suggesting that this effect is weak. The relatively low correlation coefficient has much to do with the fact that the
banks cannot easily expand their balance having to obey to the balance sheet contraint in Eq. (7), and being subject to an
explicit capital requirement as set in Eq. (8), in every period.
To study the implications of changing regulatory capital requirements, we further vary the equity ratio k (or, the inverse
of banks’ leverage ratio) in the interval [0.0,0.18] and simulate the model over this range of different ks.11 From Fig. 7 we
observe that, as banks increase their equity ratio, the correlation between animal spirits and output gap does not decline
significantly. This suggests that by raising the equity ratio of banks the authorities cannot significantly reduce the scope for
animals spirits to lead to boom and busts in economic activity in this model. In a later section we discuss ways to make the
banks’ balance sheets react to the state of the economy.
5.2. Banks amplify animal spirits
A key ingredient in our model is a pro-cyclical boom-bust cycle in credit, following a tightening or loosening of credit
conditions. This amplifies waves of optimism and pessimism, which are themselves self-fulfilling, sowing the seeds of
business cycles phases (Section 2.3).8 For a discussion on steady state estimates for the spread see also Mehra, Piguillem and Prescott (2008), Curdia and Woodford (2010).
9 Note that the (risk weighted) capital ratio in Basel III, comprising common equity and a capital conservation buffer, is equal to 7%. Basel III also
assumes the possibility of a countercyclical buffer, which is imposed within a range of 0–2.5%, bringing the common equity standard to an interval of 7–
9.5% (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). In section 6, we perform a sensitivity analysis by looking at the robustness of our results by varying
banks’ optimal equity ratio in the interval 0–18%.
10 These results are available upon request from the authors.
11 The model varies k in steps of 0.03. For values larger than 0.96 (i.e. k¼ 0. 99) the model becomes explosive.
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Fig. 1. Bank prime loan rate vs. 6-month Treasury bill.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Saint-Louis Economic Data (FRED).
Fig. 2. Output gap.
Fig. 3. Animal spirits.
P. De Grauwe, C. Macchiarelli / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 59 (2015) 95–117 103In this section we switch “on and off” the banking sector. This allows us to check the extent to which banks amplify
animal spirits. We do this by varying the parameter φ. The latter is a key parameter in the model: in fact, for φ¼ 0 there is no
spread in the economy (i.e. borrowers and lenders will face the same risk free interest rate). This corresponds to the case
where there is no banking sector. As φ increases (in absolute value), banks become more active and allow the spread to vary
as a function of the firms’ equity.
Fig. 4. Histogram output gap.
Fig. 5. Histogram animal spirits.
P. De Grauwe, C. Macchiarelli / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 59 (2015) 95–117104We vary φ in the interval 0 (i.e. no banking sector) to 0.2 to explore how the banks amplify the animal spirits. We
report the pattern of animal spirits for different values of φ in Fig. 8. The different lines in the graph are not explained by
changes in the firms’ collateral value, but by the varying presence of banks in the model. This is indeed distinct from the
leverage cycle literature (see also Section 6), which points out the amplifying effect of the interplay of the constraints faced
by borrowers and lenders.
We can see from Fig. 8 that when banks are not present φ¼ 0, tail events (periods during which everyone is pessimist or
optimist) are less likely. As soon as φ increases in absolute value, correlations in beliefs become more and more likely. Once
again, this is only explained by varying the presence of banks in the model.
Fig. 9 looks at the distribution of animal spirits in the frequency domain (the scale is the same through the different
panels in Fig. 9). Using different values of φ, Fig. 9 confirms how banks themselves amplify animal spirits. As φ increases we
obtain a larger concentration of extreme optimism and pessimism.5.3. Effects of monetary policy shocks
In this section, we analyse the impulse responses following an unanticipated increase in the interest rate. In Fig. 10, the
monetary policy shock occurs after 100 periods in the simulations to reduce the effect of starting values. The impulse
Fig. 6. Borrowing–lending spread.
P. De Grauwe, C. Macchiarelli / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 59 (2015) 95–117 105responses to a temporary i.i.d. monetary policy shock are reported for output (impulse y), inflation (impulse p), investment
(impulse i) and the spread (impulse x).
We obtain the traditional results, i.e. output, investment and inflation decline following monetary policy tightening. The
results also confirm the pro-cyclicality of credit. The interest rate induced decline in output and investment has the effect of
reducing the equity of firms. As a result, their creditworthiness declines. This then induces banks to raise the spread. Thus,
this effect is pro-cyclical, i.e. it tends to enhance the downturn initiated by the central bank's increase in its interest rate.
At this point the question would be: how much of these dynamics are explained by animal spirits? The mechanism described
previously suggests that animal spirits make agents react to the state of the economy. Looking again at the IRFs, we evaluate how the
model reacts to a monetary policy shock allowing for learning or not in the economy. Based on the model, allowing agents to learn in
real time creates endogenous correlation in beliefs, hence animal spirits, as opposed to the casewhere agents are not allowed to learn.
We carry out this exercise in two ways. We first simulate the model with a probability of shifting to each forecasting rule
equal to 0.5. As discussed previously, fixing the probability at 50% corresponds to the case where agents toss a coin (or γ ¼ 0
in the Brock-Hommes' function; see Section 2.1). Hence, there is no scope for animal spirits in the model, as the selection of
the forecast rules in the model becomes completely stochastic.
As an alternative parametrization, we use the ex post probabiliy of shifting among forecasting rules. This involves simulating the
model in two steps. First we simulate the standard model without restrictions. In a second step, we take the the ex post probability,
i.e. the probability observed after a simulation run, and use it to run the model a second time (step two). Importantly, in this way
the probability of being fundamentalist or extrapolator is indeed fixed, but different from 0.5 (i.e. in this case it will be αyf ;t ¼ 0:76
and αpf ;t ¼ 0:57).12 Using a fixed probabily clearly reduces the correlation between output and animal spirits. In case a 50%
probability is used, no animal spirits are allowed in the model. Hence, the correlation between output and animal spirits is virtually
zero (0.001). Using the probability ex post, the correlation between output and animal spirits drops to 0.72.
For the sake of brevity, we report the impulse responses to a temporary i.i.d. monetary policy shock for output (e.g.
impulse y) and inflation (e.g. impulse p) given the discussion above. The results of the standard model with heuristics (Fig. 11,
blue line) display a larger reaction compared to the case where the probability of switching between forecasting rules is
fixed. Not allowing agents to learn dampens animal spirits. This is very much the case when we use a 50% probability
(impulse y5). Using the probability ex post represents an intermediate step (impulse ypost), laying in between one extreme,
where agents learn over time, and the other extreme, where the probability of using one rule against the other remains set
at 50%, i.e. corresponding to agents tossing a coin. These results overall make clear how animal spirits actually play a crucial
role in generating some of the key findings (e.g. in terms of model persistency and volatility) in this model.
6. Leverage and stock prices
6.1. The extended bank model
In the previous sections we discussed how the balance sheet constraint implied banks could not lend more than they
borrowed from households. Banks had no alternatives other than reduce credit availability during a boom, and viceversa.
This pretty much fixed their balance sheets over the business cycle.12 However measured, using a fixed probability makes the pattern of animal spirits become discrete.
Fig. 7. Correlation output and animal spirits vs. banks' capital requirement.
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Fig. 8. Animal spirits for different values of φs. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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contract them during recessions, thereby amplifying business cycle movements. In this section we analyze one such
mechanism. It will be based on the link between the firms’ asset values and the banks’ balance sheets and it is related to
what the literature refers to as the leverage cycle (see Geanakoplos (1997, 2009)). The leverage cycle normally requires that
firms post collateral with the bank, and the bank has a balance sheet item called “posted collateral”. When, during a boom
the asset prices of good firms go up (equity increases), the firm's collateral constraint relaxes and its creditworthiness
improves. During a downturn asset prices decline, and the firm's collateral constraint becomes more biting (for further
discussion see Geanakoplos (1997, 2009), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Adrian and Shin (2010)). Based on such a
leverage cycle, an amplification effect exists when incentives for both banks and firms to bear risk related to the provision of
loans are affected. Essentially, a boost in asset and collateral values (together with the belief that the increase in asset values
is sustainable; ECB, 2011; Mankiw and Ball, 2010) may lead both borrowers and firms to accept higher risk (i.e. "risk taking
channel"), resulting in an excessive loan provision. This mechanism may easily come into play if admitting banks hold risky
assets on their balance sheets, e.g. firms’ shares, and following a positive reevaluation of the profitability of these assets.
In order to have asset price variability to contribute to the volatility in firms’ equity, we resort to the idea that firms’
market capitalization is equal to the number of (time-varying) shares (nt) multiplied by the current share price (St), i.e.
nf ;mt ¼ ntSt : ð15Þ
To derive share prices, we use the standard Gordon discounted dividend model,13
St ¼ EtΛtþ1
RSt
; ð16Þ13 See e.g., Brealey and Myers (1984).
Fig. 9. Histogram of animal spirits for different values of φs.
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RSt ¼ rtþξ; ð17Þ
linking the asset price St to expected future dividends (EtΛtþ1) net of a discount rate Rt . The latter consists of the risk-free
interest rate plus a constant equity premium (ξ). We calibrate ξ to be 5%, which is in line with the historical average market
risk premium.
The standard stable growth (Gordon) model assumes that dividends grow at a constant rate. The forecasts made by
agents about future dividends follows the logic of the forecasts they make for the output gap. Agents assume the 1-period
ahead forecast of dividends to be a fraction of nominal GDP one period ahead, whereas dividends are assumed to be
constant thereafter (from tþ1 onwards). This forecast is reevaluated in every period. Since nominal GDP consists of a real
and an inflation component, agents make a forecast of future output gap and inflation, in the same way as analyzed in
Section 2. Thus, the forecasts are reevaluated in each period, and agents are willing to switch to another forecasting rule if
this performs better than the one they currently use.
As before (Eq. (13)), we assume that the spread is determined by the value of the firms’ equity. We substitute (15) into
(13) to obtain (see also Bernanke and Gertler (2001)).
xt ¼ φntSt ; ðφo0Þ ð130Þ
Fig. 10. IRFs to monetary policy shock.
Fig. 11. IRFs to monetary policy shock with and without learning. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)
P. De Grauwe, C. Macchiarelli / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 59 (2015) 95–117108As a result, share prices, by affecting the firms’ financial positions, influence the spread. Given these additional dynamics
in S, firms’ leverage in Eq. (14) is no longer exogenous. It is defined by the new Eq. (140)
τt ¼
LDt
ntSt
ð140Þ
P. De Grauwe, C. Macchiarelli / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 59 (2015) 95–117 109Finally, the bank's balance sheet is modified in a way that allows for asset prices to feed back on the bank's balance sheet.
In particular, it is assumed that banks own a fixed fraction, n, of firms’ shares.1414 Banks hold only a fixed fraction of firms’ shares, as making banks hold firms completely would otherwise erode incentives fo
excess premium over firms’ lending.
15 This is different from De Grauwe (2008a, 2012, Chapter 7), where asset prices enter the aggregate demand directly. See also
16 The extended banking model allows for an extra pass through from animal spirits to the banks’ balance sheet. By increasing ban
are simply reducing this pass-through forcing banks’ to take less risk. If we dampen animal spirits, for instance assuming agents
probability of using one forecasting rule or the other is fixed at 50%), the correlation between output and animal spirits would be vi
time (see Figs. A1 and A2 in Appendix A) with no scope for tightening banks’ capital requirements.Tot. Assets (A) Liabilities (B)Loans (LS) Deposits (D)Risky assets ðnSÞ Own equity (nb)In this way, the sum of total assets, At , to be considered in the banks’ balance sheet identity is simply:
At ¼ LSt þnSt ; ð18Þ
and the new balance sheet constraint of the banks is given by the following:
At ¼ nbt þDt ; ð70Þ
substituting Eq. (7).
The link between asset prices and the banks’ balance sheets can now be described as follows. An increase in asset prices
increases the available collateral, leading to a decrease in leverage on the part of the borrowers, and granting potential
access to credit. Financial intermediaries, in turn, see the value of their assets increase and will then have incentives to
expand lending. This then tends to bring down the spread. Thus, asset prices affect the aggregate demand (investment) via
credit spread dynamics.15
6.2. Results with the extended banking model
We simulated the extended model using the same calibration as in the simple model. The results of the simulations are
shown in Figs. 12–16.
A comparison with the simulations obtained with the simple model of Section 2 leads to a number of interesting insights.
First, in the extended model with endogenous asset prices we obtain longer waves of optimism and pessimism leading to
larger movements in the output gap, compared to the model without endogenous asset prices. This can be seen from the
time series results of the output gap and animal spirits in Figs. 12 and 13 compared to Figs. 2 and 4 (note the different scales
in Figs. 12 and 13). The frequency distribution of the output gap exhibits fatter tails in the banking model with asset prices.
Analogously, animal spirits and their frequency distribution (Figs. 14 and 15) display more concentration of observations in
the extremes of optimism and pessimism in the new model with endogenous asset prices.
To study the implications of changing regulatory capital requirements with the extended model, we again vary the equity
ratio k in the interval [0.0,0.18], as described previously. When asset prices are included (Fig. 17), the policy implications of
varying banks’ capital requirements become much clearer. Importantly, the correlation between animal spirits and output
gap is now downward sloping with increasing values of k. This is consistent with the “risk taking channel” idea. Thus,
tightening banks’ capital requirements reduces the scope for banks to take risks, alleviating the effect of animal spirits over
the business cycle. In particular, for k¼0.15 the animal spirits vs. output's correlation drop to nearly 0.1, compared to the
case where k is 9%. This suggests that the equity ratio is of use as a policy intrument when asset prices are included in the
model.16
7. Monetary policy implications
The existence of endogenous movements in optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) has important implications for
monetary policy. The way we analyze these implications is by constructing tradeoffs between output and inflation
variability. In standard DSGE-models these tradeoffs are always downward sloping. This means that in these models, any
attempt to reduce output volatility by the use of the interest rate instrument comes at a price, i.e. more inflation volatility.
Put differently, if the monetary authorities decide to increase their ambition to stabilize output fluctuations, they may be
succesful in reducing output volatility, but this will be achieved by increasing inflation volatility.
In our behavioral model we obtain a different result. In order to show this point we construct the tradeoffs between
output and inflation volatility using the behavioral model with the simple banking sector. We do this by varying the output
coefficient in the Taylor rule equation, c2, from 0 to 1 (keeping the inflation coefficient constant). For each value of c2 we
simulate the model and compute the standard deviations of output and inflation. We plot these numbers in a figure with ther banks to charge an
Case et al. (2003).
ks’ leverage ratio we
toss a coin (i.e. the
rtually 0 most of the
Fig. 12. Output gap.
Fig. 13. Histogram output gap.
P. De Grauwe, C. Macchiarelli / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 59 (2015) 95–117110standard deviation of inflation on the vertical axis and the standard deviation of output on the horizontal axis. We repeat
this exercise for different inflation coefficients, so as to obtain one trade-off for every given inflation coefficient. The results
are reported in Fig. 18.
The striking aspect of our results is that the tradeoffs we obtain are non-linear in nature. In order to understand the
nature of this non-linear trade-off we start from point A on the tradeoff obtained when c1 ¼ 1. Point A corresponds to the
situation where the central bank sets c2 ¼ 0, i.e. it does not attempt to stabilize output at all. If the central bank then starts
increasing c2, we go down the tradeoff. This means that, for a given c1, increasing the output stabilization parameter reduces
both output volatility (not surprising) and inflation volatility (surprising). Where does this effect come from? The answer is
that by stabilizing output, the central bank helps in stabilizing animal spirits (waves of optimism and pessimism). The latter
is a source of volatility not only of output but also of inflation. By “taming the animal spirits” the central bank reduces both
inflation and output volatility. It follows that strict inflation targeting can never be optimal.
There are limits to this “win-win” situation, however. The central bank can overdo its output stabilization effort. This is
achieved where the tradeoff reaches the minimum point and becomes a negatively sloped line. We reach this point because
too much output stabilization undermines the credibility of the inflation target.
Inflation targeting remains important. We observe from Fig. 18 that, by increasing c1, the tradeoff moves downwards.
This means that, as the central bank follows a tighter inflation targeting policy rule, the tradeoffs improve. They remain non-
linear though, which means that even in tighter inflation targeting regimes it pays to stabilize output.
Fig. 14. Animal spirits.
Fig. 15. Histogram animal spirits.
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In this section, we contrast the dynamics of a standard NK model both with heuristics and under rational expectations.
For the sake of clarity, we focus on the case in which φ¼ 0; implying no asymmetry of information between lenders and
borrowers, thus the standard three equation NK model. We further impose the following set of restrictions on the model
parameters: b1 ¼ 1 (implying no backward looking term in the AS), c3 ¼ 0 (implying no interest rate smoothing) and
ðd1þ d2Þ ¼ 1 (implying no habit in consumption, and hence in the AD function). The motivation for doing so is to show how
the performance of a parsimonious model varies when assuming rational expectations, as opposed to the case in which
heuristics are used.
Having checked the model is determinate, the model under rational expectations is solved using the Binder and Pesaran
procedure (1996). Otherwise, the behavioral rules set in Section 2 are employed when simulating the model with heuristics,
and the model is solved iteratively (see Section 3.1).
Confirming standard results, we find that the model under rational expectations is unable to reproduce persistency of the
time series, nor is it capable of matching the observed third and fourth moments in time series data. The rational
expectations model is only capable of reproducing these features by slowing down the transmission of the shocks and that
of the endogenous variables (by increasing the number of lags, i.e. relaxing the restrictions above on b1, c3 and d1þ d2).
Conversely, the model with heuristics replicates the stylized facts better both in terms of autocorrelation and non-normality,
even when “mechanical frictions” are absent.
Fig. 16. Borrowing–lending spread.
Fig. 17. Correlation output and animal spirits vs. banks' capital requirement.
Fig. 18. Tradeoff output and inflation.
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Table 1
Model autocorrelations.
Heuristics NK (Smets and
Wouters, 2003)
No lags
Output gap 0.77 0.07
Inflation 0.69 0.02
Inertia
Output gap 0.89 0.79
Inflation 0.90 0.61
P. De Grauwe, C. Macchiarelli / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 59 (2015) 95–117 113Without any source of inertia in the model, the standard NK model under rational expectations produces a series for the
output gap with very little or almost no autocorrelation (0.07) (see Table 1), and whose distribution is normal (kurtosis: 2.9,
i.e. normality is non-rejected with p-value¼0.5 based on the Jarque-Bera test). This is different from the model under
heuristics where autocorrelated series and non-normality are attained, even though i.i.d. shocks are used and inertia terms
are switched off. Looking at the top left section of Table 1, the output gap's autocorrelation of the model with heuristics and
no lags is 0.77. Normality is further rejected with p-value¼0.001 (kurtosis is 5.9) based on the Jarque-Bera test.17
The possibility that imperfect information (departures from rational expectations) in NK models improves the empirical
fit has also been documented by other recent contributions, including Collard and Dellas (2004, 2006) and Slobodyan and
Wouters (2012). In particular, the latter consider learning in medium-scale DSGE models à la Smets and Wouters. They show
that learning improves the fit of the model compared with the benchmark case of rational expectations. Along the same
lines, Williams (2003), using simulation results, tests the effects of adaptive learning in benchmark RBC and New Keynesian
models and compares the implied moments with those obtained under rational expectations. He shows that these effects
are larger in the New Keynesian model compared to the standard RBC model. Finally, Jang and Sacht (2012), estimating De
Grauwe's (2012) model using moment-based methods for the euro area data reach the same conclusions. In particular, the
former authors confirm that a bounded rationality model with cognitive limitations provides a reasonable fit to auto and
cross variance of the data series, compared to the model solution under rational expectations.
One may argue that the comparison of the behavioral model with the stylized version of the Smets and Wouters (2003)
model is not complete. DSGE-models have been extended in several dimensions, being able to generate longer waves of booms
and busts. While this is true, we show here that even a parsimonious model with heuristics can account for the intrinsic
persistence in the data and for the non-normality in the movements of the output gap, a feature equally parsimonious models
with rational expectations are unable to do.
Finally, one may ask why one should not take an “off the shelf” model with banking and simply introduce heuristics, so to as
be able to compare the results under the rational expectation benchmark. First, it should be noted that our model is consistent
with many reduced-form models available in the literature.18 In addition, taking an existing reduced-form DSGE model with
banking and simply introducing heuristics would anyway imply expectation mechanisms to be imposed ex post on a reduced
system of equations which themselves have been derived from maximizing behaviour under the assumption of rational
expectations. This would have to be the case, unless axioms maintaining the rational expectation hypothesis at the aggregate
level (e.g., Branch and McGough, 2009) are imposed. While we understand this represents an important venture for further
research (and it is on our research agenda to investigate all such issues thoroughly), it goes beyond the scope of this article.9. Conclusion
In this paper we have extended the behavioral macroeconomic model of De Grauwe (2012) to include a banking sector.
The behavioral model takes the view that agents have limited congitive limitations. As a result, it is rational to use simple
forecasting rules and to subject the use of these rules to a fitness test. Agents are then driven to select the rule that performs
best. We believe that this is the proper way to define rationality in a world were agents do not understand the complexity of
the world itself. It is also in this framework that the banking sector is introduced.
Our behavioral model produces endogenous and self-fulfilling movements of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits).
Our main result is that the existence of banks intensifies these movements, creating a greater scope for booms and busts.
Thus, banks do not create but amplify animal spirits. During booms, the equity of firms increases in value. This is a signal for
the banks that the credit risk of firms declines. As a result, they are willing to lower the interest rate spread they charge on
loans. The opposite occurs during a recession. Thus, credit works procyclically and intensifies the volatility of output. In the
light of this we find that the equity ratio of banks can be used as a policy instrument, i.e. by raising the equity ratio of banks,17 The empirical autocorrelation of the US output gap is 0.96 (and kurtosis is 3.58) over the period 1960-2007.
18 See also footnote number 9.
P. De Grauwe, C. Macchiarelli / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 59 (2015) 95–117114the amplification effect that is produced by the banking sector is reduced and and as a result the influence of animal spirits
on economic activity is weakened, reducing the intensity of booms and busts in economic activity.
The other policy conclusion we derive from our results is that the central bank has an important responsibility for
stabilising output. Output stabilization is an instrument to “tame the animal spirits”. This has the effect of improving the
tradeoff between inflation and output volatility.Acknowledgments
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See Figs. A1 and A2 and Table A1.Fig. A1. Histogram animal spirits with agents tossing a coin.
Fig. A2. Correlation output and animal spirits vs. banks' capital requirements with agents tossing a coin.
Table A1
Calibrated parameters in the model.
γ ¼ 1:0 switching parameter in Brock Hommes
πn ¼ 0:0 the central bank's inflation target
d1 ¼ 0:5 marginal propensity of consumption out of income
e1 ¼ 0:1 coefficient on expected y in investment equation
d2 ¼ ð0:5Þnð1d1Þe1 coefficient on expected y in consumption equation to match a1 ¼ 0:5
d3 ¼ 0:01 coefficient on real rate in consumption equation
e2 ¼ ð0:5Þnð1d1Þd3 coefficient on real rate in investment equation to match a2 ¼ 0:5
a1 ¼ ðe1þd2Þ=ð1d1Þ coefficient of expected output in output equation
a1' ¼ d2=ð1d1Þ coefficient of lagged output in output equation
a2 ¼ ðd3þe2Þ=ð1d1Þ interest elasticity of output demand
a3 ¼ d3=ð1d1Þ coefficient on spread term in output equation
b1 ¼ 0:5 coefficient of expected inflation in inflation equation
b2 ¼ 0:05 coefficient of output in inflation equation
c1 ¼ 1:5 coefficient of inflation in Taylor equation
φ ¼ 0:02 parameter on firm equity
τ ¼ 1:43 firms' leverage (i.e. Pesaran and Xu (2013))
k ¼ 0:09 banks' inverse leverage ratio (Gerali et al., 2010)
e ¼ 0:05 equity premium
α¼ 0:2 fraction of nominal GDP forecast in expected future dividends
n¼ 40 number of shares in banks' balances sheets
n¼ 60 initial value for number of firms' shares
c2 ¼ 0:5 coefficient of output in Taylor equation
c3 ¼ 0:5 interest smoothing parameter in Taylor equation
σ1 ¼ 0:5 standard deviation shocks output equation
σ2 ¼ 0:5 standard deviation shocks inflation equation
σ3 ¼ 0:5 standard deviation shocks Taylor equation
p¼ 0:5 speed of declining weights in mean squares errors (memory)
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